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ABSTRACT
Both individual experiences andcommunitycharacteristics influence how much people trust
each other. Using data drawn from US localities we find that the strongest factors that reduce trust
are: i) a recent history of traumatic experiences, even though the passage of time reduces this effect
fairly rapidly; ii) belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against, such as minorities
(black in particular) and, to a lesser extent, women; iii) being economically unsuccessful in terms of
income and education; iv) living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of
income disparity. Religious beliefs and ethnic origins do not significantly affect trust. The latter
result may be an indication that the American melting pot at least up to a point works, in terms of
homogenizing attitudes of different cultures, even though racial cleavages leading to low trust are still
quite high.
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The economic benefits of interpersonal trust are widely recognized. When people
trust each other transaction costs in economic activities are reduced, large orga-
nizations function better, governments are more efficient, financial development is
faster. As a result, more trust may spur economic success.1 While a lively recent
economic literature has tried to measure the effect of trust on economic outcomes,
the determinants of trust are still imclear. This is an important issue, since the
level of trust both within the US and across countries varies substantially and the
goal of this paper is to shed some light on this matter.
Both individual and social characteristics are likely to influence how much peo-
ple trust each other. In particular, factors that may reduce trust include: a history
of individual misfortunes; belonging to certain groups which are either discrimi-
nated against and/or are economically unsuccessful; cultural and/or religious roots
which lead to different philosophical attitudes toward social interactions; as for the
characteristics of the place in which an individual live, they may include the level
of crime and the degree of heterogeneity of the community, under the assumption
that one trusts others who are more similar to himself.
We investigate these issues using the information provided by the General
Social Survey (GSS) for the United States, 1974-94. Wefindthat the strongest
factors that reduce trust are: (i) a recent history of traumatic experiences, even
though the passage of time reduces this effect fairly rapidly; (ii) belonging to a
group that historically has been discriminated against, such as minorities (black in
particular) and, to a lesser extent, women; (iii) being economically unsuccessful in
terms of income and education; (iv) living in a racially mixed community and/or in
one with a high degree of income disparity. We find instead that religious beliefs
and ethnic origin do not significantly affect trust. The latter result may be an
indication that the American melting pot at least up to a point works, in terms
of homogenizing attitudes of different cultures, even though mistrust across racial
lines is still quite high.
Particularly interesting are the results on income and racial heterogeneity of
the community Our prior is that most individuals are less inclined to trust those
who are different from themselves, because familiarity bread trust, as pointed out
and discussed by Coleman (1990). In heterogeneous communities participation in
groups that require direct contact among members is low, (Alesina and La Ferrara
(2000)); in particular, in racially heterogeneous communities the individuals who
do not participate are those with the strongest views against racial mixing. The
same individuals also trust others less, and ,moregenerally trust and participation
See Coleman (1990),Fukuyama(1995),Putuanii (1993) La Porta et al. (1997), Knack and
Keefer (1997), Knack and Zak (1999) and Guiso, Sapienza and Ziugales (1999).
1in social activities are positively correlated, even though the results on participation
and trust are far from identical. For instance, while after controlling for other
characteristics, blacks participate more in social and political activities, the same
group trusts significantly less.2 Similar considerations apply to women.
The effect of social interactions on trust are likely to imply complementarities
leading to a 'two equilibria' phenomenon. In the 'good' equilibrium (more likely
to occur in homogeneous communities) individuals trust each other and for that
reason more and more trust is built. In the 'bad' equilibrium (more likely to
occur in heterogeneous communities) the low level of trust reduces trust building
opportunities even more.
The results of the present paper are related to, and consistent with, a recent
literature on the effect of racial and ethnic heterogeneity on public polices in US
cities. In particular, Alesina Baqir and Easterly (1999) show that public policies
are less efficient in more heterogeneous localities in the US. The idea is that hetero-
geneous groups have more difficulties in sharing the use and the financing of public
goods; perhaps, as the present paper suggests, because they do not 'trust' each
other. Glaeser, Sheinkman and Slileifer (1995), Poterba (1996), Luttmer (1997)
and Goldin and Katz (1999) discuss the effects of racial fragmentation for several
specific policy issues. Alesina, Baqir and Hoxby (1999) show that the formation
of political jurisdictions is strongly influenced by a desire to reduce racial mixing
in public policies. Work on international data leads to similar results. La Porta
et al (1999) show that the 'quality of government' is higher in less fragmented
societies. Easterly and Levine (1997) show that growth is lower in more ethnically
fragmented countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some hypotheses re-
garding what may determine trust. Section 3 presents the data and some simple
correlations. Section 4 displays our basic regressions and sensitivity. Section 5
discusses alternative channels that may link fragmentation and trust and explores
the role of heterogeneity more in depth. The last section concludes.
2 What determines trust? Hypotheses
The theory of what determines 'trust' is sketchy at best. Here we highlight a few
possible channels.
First, trusting others may be a moral or cultural attitude. If this is the case
trust should be very strongly influenced by individual characteristics such as the
2The finding that blacks participate more in political activities is also common in the political
science literature: see for instance Verba and Nie (1987). Alesina and La Ferrara (2000)find
that blacks participate more in a variety of social groups. This finding is not driven only by the
higher church participation in the South.
2level and type of education received. Also, religious beliefs may be important since
different religions may have different attitudes toward social interactions and the
'polity'.
Second, trust may be based on past experience. One trusts others if he is used
to be treated fairly by his fellow men. This is a sort of a reciprocity argument
for trust. Note that this argument may apply both at an individual level and at
a 'group' level. If an individual has been hurt in past interactions with others
he may trust less. Also if a group has been discriminated against dejureor de
facto, members of that group will not expect to be treated fairly in the future and
therefore will trust less.
Third, one may trust more the people who are more 'similar' to himself, that
is family members or members of the same social, racial or ethnic group. In
fact family ties are particularly strong in societies were social trust is not very
developed.3 This also underlies some of the findings concerning the development
of financial markets in areas where family or kinship ties are particularly strong.'1
For the purpose of this paper this argument is especially relevant because it may
imply that trust is lower in communities which are less homogeneous in terms
of racial, ethnic or religious composition and in communities with more income
inequality.
Fourth, people may trust more others with whom they have had a longer
interaction.5 Also trust may be increased by an expectation of repeated interaction
in the future. The possibility of retaliation is a basic requirement for cooperative
equilibria, so sporadic interactions should be less conducive to 'trust' in the sense
of expecting cooperative behavior.6 If this is the case, people who have lived longer
in a community may be more likely to trust. In the aggregate, the more stable
and less 'transient' a commimity is, the higher is trust.
Fifth, legal institutions may affect trust. In a community where criminal be-
havior is effectively persecuted, individuals will trust more because they will feel
more protected against extreme non cooperative behavior. In our sample legal
institutions are invariant although the level of crime is not.
An important question is how much the level of somebody's trust is influenced
by the average level of trust in a community. For instance, suppose that some-
body's culture, religion or education would lead him not to trust others. Imagine
now that this individual is moved (exogenously) to a community where everybody
3See Banfield (1967).
4See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (1999) for an application to Southern Italy, and La Ferrara
(1997) for results on developing countries.
5See Coleman (1990)fora convincing argument of why this is the case.
6Whether the word 'trust' applies to a sitnation where cooperation is achieved by reciprocal
threat is a semantic issue which we do not discuss here.
3trusts others. Will this individual trust more in the new community? If a higher
level of social trust leads to more individual trust, we have the making of a multi-
ple equilibria situation, since we have compiementarities in trust. An interesting
empirical imnphcation of these ideas concerns immigrants in a new country. If the
level of trust in the country of origin is different from the one of the country of
destination, how does the immigrant's attitude towards trust change?7
In summary we can think of five broad factors influencing how much people
trust others: 1) individual culture, traditions and religion; 2) how long an individ-
ual has lived in a community with a stable composition; 3) recent personal history
of misfortune; 4) the perception of being part of a discriminated group; 5) several
characteristics of the composition of one's community, including how much trust
there is in the community. In our empirical analysis we find that the last three
elements matter much more than the first two.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1Data
Ourmain data source is the General Social Survey (GSS) for the years 1974-94.
This survey interviews about 1,500 individuals every year from a nationally repre-
sentative sample, and contains a variety of indicators on the respondents' political
views, social behavior, and demographic characteristics.8 In particular, one crucial
question for our purposes is the following: "Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with peo-
ple?". We define as tntstrtgthoseindividuals who answer that "most people can
be trusted", and non-trusting those who say that "you can't be too careful" or that
"it depends". This will be the key variable which we want to explain. We will also
make use of other questions concerning how much the respondent trusts not other
people in general, but certain institutions, like banks and financial institutions,
7Obviously an empirical investigation of this point would need to tackle issues of self selection
of immigrants. In ally case, we will not be able to address this point because our data do not
contain information on the place of birth of the respondent, nor on the state from which he or
she may be coming from (if the respondent has moved at some point).
8This survey is being more and more often used not only by sociologists but also by economists
For detailed information about the GSS, see Davis and Smith (1994). Here we only mention that
our sample will be smaller than the 'nominally available' sample for a variety of reasons. First,
there were three years (1979, 1981 and 1992) in \vhich the survey was not conducted. Second,
the variable 'trust' (to be defined below) is missing for about one third of the years. Finally,
as it will be explained below, not every respondent can be matched with the geographic area of
residence, so when we control for community characteristics we are forced to further restrict the
sample.
4the Congress, the army, public officials, medical doctors, etc. Other variables of
particular interest for us are those that measure individual attitudes toward racial
mixing, because they may capture positive or negative feelings towards individuals
of a different race or ethnicity.
As it is generally the case with survey data, one has to be aware of how the
responses reflect actual behavior. A respondent may feel 'good' about himself if
he answers affirmatively to the question about trusting others, even though in his
actual behavior he may not be a trusting person. This may induce an upward bias
in the number of affirmative answers. and this motivates our choice of categorizing
as non trusting the answer "it depends". The critical question is however whether
this bias is correlated with our right hand side variables, and this is far from
obvious. The fraction of 'no' to the question of trusting others is .6; thus, even
if there were a bias in the negative answers, we still have more than half of the
respondent saying that they do not trust.
A more subtle issue is raised by Glaeser et al (2000). They find that answering
yes to a question about trusting others is more correlated to being trustworthy in
experiment than to being trusting. These experiments suggest two things. The
first is that we have to be cautious in interpreting answers to questions on trust in
surveys. The second is that perhaps individuals who say they trust feel that they
have to be trustworthy to reciprocate.
Among the explanatory variables we include several individual characteristics
like education, income, marital status etc. The GSS contains also information
about the recent and not so recent 'history' of the respondent. In particular we
can check how recent tranmas like divorce, diseases, accidents, financial misfor-
tune, affect people's trust. As we discuss below, some of these events are clearly
exogenous (e.g., accidents), while others may be endogenous to trust (e.g., di-
vorce). In addition we can also check whether individuals' mobility and changes
of community of residence affect their level of trust.
As for community variables we are especially interested in the degree of in-
come inequality and of racial and ethnic fragmentation. One can identify the
MSA/PMSA of the respondent for about 2/3 of the total number of the respon-
dents in the GSS. To measure income inequality we use the Gini coefficient for the
MSA/PMSA computed using family income for 1970, 1980 and 1990. We obtained
the remaining years by interpolation and extrapolation. Our racial fragmentation
index is, by now, standard in the literature and represents the probability that two
randomly drawn individuals in an MSA/PMSA belong to two different races. The
index is therefore increasing in heterogeneity and it is computed as follows:
Race =1— (1)
where i represents an MSA/PMSA and k the following races: i) Whites; ii) Black;
5iii) American Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian; iv) Asian and Pacific Islander; v) Other.
The Census does not identify the category Hispanic; however the category "Other"
has a correlation of point 0.9 with the category Hispanic obtained with different
sources. Therefore, for all practical pnrposes, other means "Hispanic". Each term
3ki represents the share of race k in the total population of MSA/PMSA 1.
Our ethnic fragmentation index is computed in a way analogous to (1) but
instead of using race we use the fraction of individuals in an MSA/PMSA with
the same ethnic/national origin. The original ancestry data reported in the 1990
Census break down ethnicity in 35 categories or countries of origin. We aggregate
them in 10 categories in order to avoid giving the same weight to very similar
countries of origin (say Sweden and Norway) and to very different ones (say Ireland
and India).9
We use our index of racial fragmentation (Race) and of ethnic fragmentation
(Ethnic) for 1990. We do not interpolate as we did with Cmi for two reasons.
First racial and ethnic composition of MSAs/PMSAs are stable over relatively
short periods of times, much more so than measures of income inequality. Second,
the 1970 and 1980 Censuses report different racial and ancestry breakdowns than
the 1990 one and some adjustments would have been necessary. The Appendix
reports definitions and sources of all the variables used in the present paper.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1 displays the national distribution of our variable of interest, Thzst.
[Insert figure 1 here]
This picture shows high values of trust in the north/north west and low values
in the south east.10 The state with the highest percentage of respondents who
"generally trust others" is North Dakota; the state with the lowest percentage is
Delaware. In the 'top 5' list for trust we also find Montana, Minnesota. South
Dakota, and Wyoming. These states are all very homogeneous in terms of racial
and ethnic composition of the population, and display relatively low levels of in-
equality. Among the five states with the lowest average trust there are instead
Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and North Carolina. all states with a racially and
ethnically fragmented population and with a very unequal distribution of income.
As we will argue below, we believe there is something systematic in this pattern
of correlations between trust and heterogeneity of the population.
9More detailsregardingthe construction of this index can be found in the Appendix. Our
results are not sensitive to reasonable changes in the aggregation riñes for nations of origin.
'0This pattern is similar to findings about participation in social activities (Alesina and La
Ferrara (2000))andaggregate measines of 'social capital' (Putnam and Yonish (1998)).
6[Insert table 1 herel
Table 1 describes our variables of interest. The first column displays sample
averages, which for the trust variables represent the fraction of respondents who say
that they trust other people or institutions (as listed in each row). On average,
40 percent of the respondents say that "most people can be trusted", and the
trend is generally declining from the 1970s to the 1980s and 1990s.'1 When we
move from trust in people to trust in institutions, we find a lot of variation across
types of institutions. The highest degree of confidence is attributed to relatively
'impersonal' categories like "medicine" and the "scientific community". The lowest
degree of confidence is that in "organized labor", followed by "congress" and at the
fourth place by the "executive branches of the federal government". Interestingly
the media, as represented by television, also enjoy an extremely low level of trust
(15 percent).
The second colunm of table 1 reports the correlation between Trust and con-
fidence in the different institutions (the full correlation matrix between confidence
in all types of institutions is reported in the Appendix). The variables that dis-
play the highest positive correlation with trust in people are confidence in science,
in major companies, and in the supreme court. However, even these correlation
coefficients are fairly low, in the range of .12-15. This is not too surprising be-
cause trusting an institution is quite a different thing from trusting a person: for
instance, trusting an institution like trade unions may be correlated with political
beliefs, while trusting others should be less so. Trust is also positively correlated
with confidence in public officials, religious institutions, and financial institutions,
but the coefficients are even smaller. An interesting exception stands out: trusting
people is inversely correlated with confidence in the army. Perhaps individuals
who do not trust others rely on the army as an institution that can protect them
in an world that cannot be trusted. Finally, note that trusting others is inversely
related to trusting television. This is consistent with Putnam's argument that the
diffusion of television viewing reduces social capital (Putnam and Yonish (1998)).
It is however interesting that very few people say that they have confidence in TV
despite the widespread use of this medium.
In the last three rows of table 1 we report the sample mean of our three
heterogeneity variables, Cmi, Race, and Ethnic, and their correlations with Trust.
We can see that trusting others is negatively and significantly correlated with all
three measures of heterogeneity, though the coefficient on the variable Ethnic is
smaller in absolute value than the other two. In the following sections we turn to
multivariate analysis to better investigate this link.
11This figure includes peop'e who answer affirmatively the trust question, but not those who
say that "it depends".
74 Econometric evidence
4.1 Individual characteristics
[Insert table 2 here]
We begin in Table 2 by regressing the variable Trust on a set of individual
characteristics of the respondent, plus year and state dummies. Column 1 reports
our 'minimal' specification. First, the variable Cohort is negative and significant,
indicating a trend toward a reduction in the amount of trust in society. This result
is consistent with Putnam's (1995) argument that 'social capital' is declining in
the US.Thevariables capturing the age structure indicate that trust becomes
lower in older age. Two particularly interesting coefficients are those on women
and black: they are both negative and highly significant, especially the one on the
latter. The size of the black coefficient is very large in absolute value: a black
person is 23 per cent less likely to trust others that a non black. This is evidence
consistent with the view that being part of a group (blacks and, to some extent,
women) that historically has been discriminated against leads to lower trust. Note
that while blacks trust less, they participate more in political and social activities,
indicating that our result on trust does not capture some generic attitude towards
anti-social behavior. Women participate less in social activities, but because of
a time constraint. In fact, women vote more than men, since voting is an act of
participation that does not requre a significant amount of time.'2
Income and education are positively correlated with trust; a successful pro-
fessional experience is likely to make individuals more prone to trusting
The effect of education is large: the difference in the probability of an affirmative
answer between a respondent with less than 12 years of education and one with
more than 16 is about 0.32. On the other hand, marital status is uninfluential.
Note, for future reference, that this result implies that it does not seem to be
the case that people who trust more also tend to marry more easily, which would
imply, by reverse causation, a positive coefficient on the variable married. Part
time work has a small positive effect. The time dummies, not shown, do not dis-
play a particular pattern; remember, however, that the declining trend in trust is
captured by the variable cohort.
In colunm 2 of table 2 we add a few more controls which have to do with past
experience of the respondent. All the coefficients on the other variables capturing
12For all these results on participation of blacks and women see Alesina and La Ferrara (2000).
Thatpaper shows that respondents with young children participate significantly less in social
activities, probably because of a binding time constraint. This interpretation is confirmed by the
insignificant coefficient on the same variable in this regression for trust.
'3We have thoroughly investigated for non linear effects on income, but we did not find anything
of interest to report. Results are available.
8individual characteristics discussed above remain very stable. The variable cap-
turing whether the respondent is divorced or separated is significant and negative,
although this effect is much smaller than the effect of education or of being black.
It has the same order of magnitude of the effect of getting older. In addition, this
coefficient may be plagued by a reverse causality problem.14 The variable Trauma,
which captures whether an individual has suffered a major negative experience in
the past year, has a negative coefficient. Trauma includes occurrences which are
clearly exogenous (diseases) and some that may be partially endogenous (divorce).
However, we believe endogeneity should not be a particular concern in this case,
because we verified that the occurrence of traumas to close relatives had similar
effects on the respondent's trust to his or her own traumas. When we analyzed the
occurrences one by one, we noted that the financial misfortune was the strongest
determinant of low trust. We also verified the effect of the occurrence of a trau-
matic experience in the previous 5 years, rather than one year. This variable had
no effect on trust. This result may suggest that traumas are forgotten relatively
quickly. However, given the very large number of respondents who had suffered at
least one trauma in that 5 year period, it is difficult to draw robust inferences on
this point.'5
In column 3 we add variables that capture the religious affiliation of the re-
spondent. Interestingly, these variables are totally insignificant. Results are similar
when we use the religion of the respondent at age 16, as opposed to current reli-
gion. Other researchers (La Porta et al (1999)) working on cross country samples
have found that religious affiliation sometimes influences the quality of govern-
ment. One explanation for that finding relies on the attitude of different religions
toward the common good and the social interaction with others, especially those
of a different religion.16 Our results on the US suggest that the American 'melting
pot' works, or, to put it more generally, it suggests that social interaction more
than philosophical/religious attitudes influences trust. In other words, our results
suggest that it is not the religious beliefs per se but the organized forms of religion
in different parts of the world that may influence differently social behavior.
4.2 Heterogeneity and trust
[Insert table 3 herej
In table 3 we focus on characteristics of the MSA/PMSA where the respondent
lives. We have added to the regression of column 2 of Table 2 a set of variables
14ff we leave this variable out, none of the other coefficients is affected in any significant way.
15A11 these results are available upon request.
16Note, however, that these authors find that the level of per capita income often overshadows
the effect of religious affiliation.
9capturing various features of the communities. We do not report all the coefficients
on the individual characteristics discussed above since they remain very stable. As
always, Regressions in table 3 also include year and state dummies. Column 1
includes the size of the place, median family income in the MSA/PMSA, and an
index of crime. Column 2 adds the Gini coefficient. Column 3 and 4 add one
at a time the two variables of racial and ethnic fragmentation. The last coltimn
includes all the variables together. First, note that both the size of the place and
crime are not significant. These two variables are positively correlated but even
if we drop size of place from this regressions, crime remains insignificant.'7
Second, when we introduce our three measures of heterogeneity one at a time
we find that Gini and Race are significant, while Ethnic is not, even though it has
the expected sign. Inequality and racial fragmentation are positively correlated,
and when we add them both in the last column of the table we find that Race
remains highly significant while Cmi looses significance. This suggests that Race
is a stronger determinant of trust than Cmi. The magnitude of the effect of Race
is substantial. Moving form the most homogeneous MSA where Race=0.06 to the
most heterogeneous where racial fragmentation is 0.61, trust would fall by about
12 percentage points, i.e. about 30 per cent of the mean. Starting from the sample
mean, an increase by one standard deviation in Race decreases the probability of
trusting others by 3 percentage points, i.e. almost 10 per cent of the mean value.
This effect is larger than the effect of having had a traumatic experience in the last
year, and almost the same size as the effect of being divorced or separated. Similar
considerations apply for income inequality: an increase in Gini by one standard
deviation decreases the likelihood of trust by 2.5 percentage points.
We have tested for the robustness of these coefficients by eliminating influential
observations through the DFbeta method (Belsley et al. (1980)). Our results got
actually stronger: while maintaining statistical significance, the marginal impact
of a one standard deviation in Race became a decrease in the probability of trust
of more than 5 percentage points namely 12.5 per cent of the mean, and that for
Cmi a decrease of 3 percentage points i.e. about 10 percent of the mean.'8
Regarding potential concerns for the endogeneity of the variable Czmz (e.g., be-
cause communities with higher levels of trust may offer better opportunities for the
advancement of relatively poor people), we have estimated our regression using two
stage least squares. We used three instruments for Cmi: the number of municipal
17This result seems a bit surprising. We wonder whether it may have to do with poor data
quality on crime. In fact, the FBI data from which our variable is constructed rely on the
voizintary contribution of crime statistics by law enforcement agencies. Not all agencies contribute
data for every month of the year. Furthermore, as explained in the Appendix. we are forced to
convert the FBI county level data into an index at the MSA/PMSA level, and this is likely to
introduce some noise.
18Results are available from the authors.
10and township governments in 1962 (NG0V62), the percentage of revenues from
intergovernmental transfers in 1962 (REVIG62) and the share of the labor force
in the manufacturing sector in 1990 (MANSHR). The rationale behind the use
of these instruments is the following. Metropolitan areas that were fragmented in
many jurisdictions in 1962 are likely to be more unequal due to possible differences
in policies and public good provision among those jurisdictions. Receiving trans-
fers from higher levels of government is also likely to affect inequality, although it
is not clear that the direction of causality would not go the other way.'9 Finally,
where a large fraction of the labor force is employed in manufacturing, we expect
the level of inequality to be lower. Overall, the instrument in which we have most
confidence is NGOV62, but we will experiment with various combinations of the
three.
[Insert table 4 here]
Table 4 displays the coefficients on Cmi from the two stage least squares model
(top panel), and those on the instruments in the first stage regression (bottom
panel). The first column reports the linear probability model, for comparison. We
can immediately see that compared to the coefficient in column 1, when we instru-
ment we find a stronger negative effect of inequality on trust. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that people who are intrinsically more inclined to trust oth-
ers are also less averse to living around people with different income levels, which
would imply a downward bias of the OLS coefficient on Cmi (in absolute value).
In any case, standard tests do not seem to indicate the need for instrumentation.20
In summary, table 3 has shown that racial and income heterogeneity strongly
influence trust, and, amongst the two, racial fragmentation of a community has
the strongest effect. In other words, people are more likely to trust others in an
unequal city than in a racially fragmented one. Table 4 has shown that the negative
impact of income heterogeneity survives, and is even reinforced, when we account
for the potential endogeneity of Ciizi.
4.3Mobilityand trust
One of the possible determinants of trust that we had conjectured in section 2 was
geographical mobility. On the one hand, an individual who has not been living
19For example. if intergovernmental transfers are directed to more unequal MSAs, this instru-
ment would be imperfect.
201n three out of four cases, the Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis of weak exogeneity
of Gni at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, the Sargan test suggests that our instruments are
valid (especially NGOV62 and REVIC62).
11in the current place of residence for long may be less inclined to trust others, be-
cause he or she may not know other people enough. On the other hand, living
in a community in which everyone is 'transitory', in the sense of not permanently
residing in the community. should lower trust because the scope for repeated inter-
action, hence for retaliation and enforcement of cooperative equilibria, is reduced.
In table 5 we test these effects with the information available in the GSS. We add
various measures of mobility to the specification in column 3 of table 3, which
includes in addition to individual controls and state dummies the characteristics
of the community in terms of income, size and racial fragmentation.
[Insert table 5 here]
The first and second column add to our basic specification a dummy taking
value 1 if the respondent has been living in the same state or in the same city,
respectively, since the age of sixteen. Both variables are interacted with the age
of the respondent to account for the fact that residential stability should not have
the same impact on a 17 years old and on a 65 years old person who have been
living in the same place since they were 16. As we can see, both variables have the
expected sign but neither is statistically significant.
In the subsequent columns we introduce various measures of residential stabil-
ity in the community where the respondent lives, constructed from Census data.
In column 3 we add the fraction of residents in the MSA/PMSA who were born
in the same state where they currently live. This variable has a positive and sig-
nificant impact on trust. In column 4 we use the fraction of people who were
living in the same county five years before 1990. Though positive, the coefficient
on this variable is not statistically significant. In the last column, we introduce
a similar variable, but more tightly linked to the stability of the 'neighborhood',
which ideally is the notion we would like to capture. This is the fraction of people
in the MSA/PMSA of the respondent who were living in the same house five years
before 1990. As we can see, this variable has a strong positive effect on trust,
and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Overall, the results in table
5 seem to suggest that, as far as mobility is concerned, what matters most for an
individual's inclination to trust is not his or her own mobility, but the stability of
the community in which he or she lives. Interestingly, the effects of 'stability' of a
community become much less significant if we do not include our measure of racial
fragmentation, while the reverse is not true.21 This suggests that amongst the two
types of variables, mobility and fragmentation, the latter set seems more robust
211n particular, the only variable that retains a positive and significant coefficient is the fraction
of people born in the same state where they live, while the residential variables are still positive
but no longer statistically significant.
12and important. There is also an interesting interaction between these two vari-
ables. Rappaport (1999) finds that after controlling for many other factors, more
ethnically fragmented counties have lost population and the more homogeneous
one have gained it. Our measures of mobility capture the influx of new residents;
thus more homogeneous counties are also, ceteris paribus. more mobile. This effect
may contribute to explain why mobility tends to loose significance if the degree of
racial fragmentation is not controlled for in the regression.22
Finally, notice that the GSS does not contain information on the place of origin
of the respondent, neither in terms of birth nor in terms of previous residential
location. This implies that we cannot exploit data on trust or fragmentation in
the place of origin for migrants to assess whether it is the 'initial imprinting' that an
individual receives or the current location that affect trust in the most significant
way.23
5 Why does heterogeneity matter for trust?
The previous section shows two results relating race and trust. One is that mi-
norities trust other people less, and the other is that more racially fragmented
communities display a lower level of trust. These two results viewed together are
compatible with two, non mutually exclusive, interpretations. One is that people
distrust those who are dissimilar from themselves; therefore, in more heteroge-
neous communities since interracial contacts (and contacts across income brack-
ets) are more frequent then trust is lower. We shall refer to this interpretation
as the "aversion to heterogeneity" explanation. A second interpretation has to do
with complementarities in individuals' willingness to trust. If an individual is sur-
rounded by non-trusting people, he or she may be less inclined to trust others, and
vice versa. According to this line of reasoning, our result on fragmentation could
be interpreted as follows. In more racially mixed communities the percentage of
minorities (especially blacks) is higher. Since this group has a lower propensity
to trust, average trust in the community is lower, and therefore everybody trusts
less as an equilibrium response to a low trust environment. A similar argument
applies to heterogeneity in income, since the poor trust less and the fraction of
people living in poverty is, ceteris paribus, higher in more unequal communities.
We shall refer to the second interpretation as the "local interaction" one. In this
section we try to distinguish between these two hypotheses and we conclude that
the first is almost certaithy present, while the available data make it difficult to
22Rappaport (1999) used county level data and not MSA so this comparison of results should
be taken with caution.
23A test along these lines is performed for Italian regions by Guiso et al. (1999).
13reach a definitive conclusion on the second.
Ideally, to discriminate between the "aversion to heterogeneity" and the "local
interaction" interpretation, one would want to control for the average level of trust
in the area where an individual lives. Wecannotdo this because the General
Social Survey (which is the only available source with data on trust for our sample
period) is not representative at the MSA/PMSA level. We therefore resort to a
variety of additional tests which, overall, seem to allow us to reach at least partial
conclusions.
First, we used as a proxy for average trust in the place where the respondent
lives some community level characteristics that can be constructed from Census
data, Since we saw in table 2 that ceteris paribus low income people and blacks
trust less, we introduced in the regressions with income inequality and racial frag-
mentation (columns 2 and 3 of table 3) respectively the fraction of families below
poverty and the percentage of blacks in the MSA/PMSA where the respondent
lives. In both cases the heterogeneity measure used (Cmi or Race) retained a neg-
ative coefficient, significant at the 1 percent level.24 Although this test does not
allow us to discriminate among the two hypotheses, it should reduce the doubt that
heterogeneity is simply capturing some average characteristic of the community.
Secondly, we have repeated the regressions of Table 3 only for black respon-
dents. This is a stronger test, because if the "local interaction" interpretation were
correct, racial fragmentation should not, in principle, affect respondents differently
according to their race. Even if it did, it should lead black people to trust rela-
tively less than white people when the community is more fragmented, because on
the basis of intra-racial networks, blacks should be the ones who interact the most
with other low-trusting blacks. We find exactly the opposite result, namely racial
heterogeneity is insignificant in the regressions in which the sample is restricted to
black respondents only.25 In addition, this result shows that it is the level of trust
of whites that goes down in more heterogenous communities.
A third test explores how individuals answer questions concerning trust not in
other people but in certain institutions.
[Insert table 6 here]
In table 6 we report the results of regressions identical to those of table 3, but
the left hand side variable is now the response to questions about confidence in a
variety of different institutions. Each cell of column 1 reports the coefficient on
Cmi from a separate regression in which the dependent variable is confidence in the
institution listed by row, and that includes all the usual individual and community
24Results are available.
25Results are available.
14controls. Columns 2 and 3 display, respectively, the coefficients on etimic fragmen-
tation and on the individual black dummy variable for an analogous pattern of
regressions. The important result here is that the variable Race is never negative
and significant, in stark contrast with the results of table 3. If racial fragmentation
were proxying for the low average trust of black people in the area, we should still
find a negative coefficient on this variable, because column 3 shows that the lower
propensity to trust of blacks still holds for many institutions. Instead, looking
down column 2 we find nine positive coefficients on Race (one even statistically
significant) and only three negative (and statistically insignificant). This suggests
that racial fragmentation affects how much people trust other individuals but it
does not influence in a generic sense the overall level of trust. Analogous results
hold for income inequality: none of the coefficients on Cmi in column 1 is negative
and significant. We find this an indirect but rather strong confirmation of the first
interpretation both for racial and income heterogeneity. On the side, notice that
while from column 3 black respondents have a lower level of trust in public in-
stitutions, there is an important exception constituted by educational ones. This
is an interesting result because it is consistent with the literature showing that
blacks are more supportive than whites of public education, even after controlling
for income.26 In summary, racial and income heterogeneity influence interpersonal
trust, but not some generic notion of trust in institutions. Thus, heterogeneity of a
community influences that component of trust which has to do with interpersonal
interactions.
Finally, to better assess the role of racial fragmentation we explored other
responses that identify the attitude of individuals toward racial mixing. The GSS
asks several questions about individual attitudes towards racial relations, such as
"have you had a person from the opposite race home from dinner?", "would you
vote for a black president?", "would you send your children to school with children
of the opposite race?", etc. We build binary variables that separate individuals
'averse' to the opposite race from 'non averse' ones, and estimate the impact of
racial heterogeneity separately for these two categories of people.27 We have used
responses to nine questions concerning racial relations. These are essentially all
the usable questions in the GSS concerning racial relations.28
26See Rubinfeld, Shapiro and Roberts (1987) for a survey and additional references.
2TWe are estimating the following equation Y =Xjj3+ HCJA.YA + HIN7N + Ec where Y
is the latent variable underlying the probit model for trust, X, represents all other controls, H
is racial fragmentation in the community, P4 is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i is averse to
the opposite race', and 1N =1—P4. The coefficient 'y't therefore captures the impact of racial
fragmentation on trust for 'averse' individuals, whilecaptures the impact of heterogeneity
for non averse ones.
28Some questions could not be used because the responses were to skewed toward yes or no.
We dropped a few other questions because they were minor variations around one of the nine
15[Insert table 7 herej
The regressions estimated in table 7 are simple trust regressions (i.e. the depen-
dent variable is Trust)includingall the usual individual and community controls.
Each row refers to a separate regression in which the coefficient on Race is esti-
mated separately for individuals who answer 'Yes' to the question listed by row
and those who answer 'No'. The first column displays the estimated coefficient
on racial fragmentation for 'averse' individuals, and the second column for 'non
averse' ones. The last column reports the fraction of respondents who answered
'Yes' to the question. If the "aversion to heterogeneity" hypothesis were true, we
should observe a significant difference between the two sets of coefficients, with
those in the first column being more negative. This is precisely what we find. In
addition, column 3 shows that the difference between the coefficients is statistically
significant in most cases. We find this test particularly compelling, because it cap-
tures differences in the impact of heterogeneity on trust among individuals within
the same MSA, hence the results cannot depend on omitted city-specific charac-
teristics. Overall, we believe this table shows overwhelming support for the view
that the variable Race affects the level of trust much more for individuals that are
averse to racial mixing. Once again this is consistent with the first interpretation
proposed above.
6 Conclusions
Trust seems to be explained by three main factors: i) individual characteristics,
including education, income and the occnrrence of recent 'misfortunes'; ii) be-
longing to groups which traditionally claim to have been discriminated against,
especially women and minorities (blacks in particular); and iii) the characteristics
of the community: interpersonal trust is lower in more racially heterogeneous com-
munities, in those with higher income inequality, and to a lesser extent, in more
transient communities. The effect of heterogeneity on trust is at least in part due
to the fact that individuals trust those more similar to themselves.
While we have found some convincing evidence that racial and income frag-
mentation reduce trust in communities, we cannot exclude that a second and non
mutually exclusive channel is also operative, namely a link between the average
level of trust in a community and individuals' attitude toward trust. This second
channel leads directly to complementarities and multiple equilibria. Thus if both
channels (fragmentation and complementarities effects) are present then we can
draw the following picture. In more heterogeneous communities the average trust
presented and the responses were, in fact, extremely correlated with one of the nine that we
present. More details available upon request.
16is lower, and this induces people to trust even less, leading to a low trust self en-
forcing equilibrium. In more homogeneous communities the opposite self enforcing
equilibrium materializes.
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Appendix
Variable definition
The following is a list of the variables we use and of their sources, followed by
summary statistics. The data sources are abbreviated as follows: GSS stands for
'General Social Survey, cumulative file 1972-94'; CensusCD9O refers to the CDrom
"CensusCD+Maps" by GeoLytics, Inc. (1996-98) which contains data from the
Summary Tape Files 3F of the 1990 Census. In all cases from variables constructed
from the GSS, 'no answer' and 'not applicable' were coded as missing values. Unless
otherwise stated, the source of a variable is authors' calculation on GSS data.
Trust: drnnmy equal to 1 if respondent says that "most people can be trusted",
and to 0 if he or she says that "you can't be too careful" or that "it depends".
Cohort: year of birth of the respondent.
Age<30: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is less than 30 years old.
Age3O-39: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is between 30 and 39 years old.
Age5O-59: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is between 50 and 59 years old.
Age6O: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is 60 years old or more.
Married: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is married.
Female: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is female.
Black: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is African American.
Educ<12 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has less than 12 years of
education.
Educ>16 yrs: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has more than 16 years of
education.
Children: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has children.
ln(real income): logarithm of respondent's family income (constant 1986
US$).
Full-time: dummy equal to 1 if respondent works full time.
Partime: dummy equal to 1 if respondent works part time.
Divorced/Separ: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is divorced or separated.
Trauma: dummy equal to 1 if the niunber of traumatic events (deaths, di-
vorces, unemployments, and hospitalizations-disabilities) happening to respondent
in the previous year is positive.
Protestant: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is Protestant.
Catholic: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is Catholic.
Jewish: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is Jewish.
19Other religion: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is religious but not Protes-
tant, Catholic, or Jewish.
Size of place: logarithm of the size of place where respondent lives (thousands
of people).
Med 1111 income: logarithm of median hot sehold income in MSA/PMSA
where respondent lives [Source: authors' calculation on CensusCD9O]
Med HH inc. 2: square of the logarithm of median household income in
MSA/PMSA where respondent lives [Source: authors' calculation on CensusCD9OJ.
Crime: number of serious crimes per person in the MSA/PMSA where re-
spondent lives, in the year of the interview. Serious crimes are those included in
the FBI Crime Index, which reports seven offenses: murder, forcible rape, rob-
bery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. The
FBI data is at the county level, while the geographic identifiers for our respon-
dents are at the MSA/PMSA level.For the cases in which all the MSA or
PMSA belonged to one single county, we have attributed the crime index of the
county to that MSA/PMSA. For the cases in which more counties were in the
same MSA/PMSA, we have built a weighted average of the crime indexes of those
counties, with the weights being the share of the population in the MSA which
belongs to a given county. The matching codes and the allocation factors for
MSAs, PMSAs, and counties were taken from the MABLE geographic database
(http://plue.sedac.ciesin.org/plue/geocorr/). Finally, the FBI data is available
yearly for the period 1977-93. We have obtained the remaining years by interpo-
lation and extrapolation. [Source: authors' calculation on CensusCD9OI.
Cmi: Cmi coefficient on family income in MSA/PMSA where respondent lives.
Actual Gini coefficients were computed for the years 1970, 1980, 1990. The values
for the remaining years in the sample were obtained by linear interpolation (and
extrapolation for 1991-94). [Source: authors' calculation on IPUMS 1%, Census
1970, 1980, 1990]
Race: racial fragmentation index in MSA/PMSA where respondent lives, de-
fined in expression (1) in the text. The five categories used for the shares are
the original Census categories: i) white; ii) black; iii) American Indian, Eskimo,
Aleutian; iv) Asian, Pacific Islander; v) other. [Source: authors' calculation on
CensusCD9O]
Ethnic: ethnic fragmentation index in MSA/PMSA where respondent lives,
defined in expression (1) in the text. The 10 categories used for the shares are
obtained aggregating the original 'first ancestries' from the Census as follows:
(1) Arab; (2) Sub-Saharan African; (3) West Indian; (4) Race or Hispanic ori-
gin; (5) Canadian, United States or American; (6) Austrian, Belgian, Dutch,
English, French Canadian, German, Irish, Scotch-Irish, Scottish, Swiss, Welsh;
(7) Czech, Hungarian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, Ukrainian,
20Yugoslavian; (8) Frendh, Greek, Italian, Portuguese; (9) Danish, Finnish, Nor-
wegian, Swedish; (10)other.Each share is computed a share of people in that
category over the total population in the MSA/PMSA (excluding people with 'an-
cestry unclassified' and 'ancestry not reported'). [Source: authors' calculation on
CensusCD9O]
NGOV62: number of municipal and township governments in the MSA/PMSA
in 1962 [Source: Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999)]
REVIG62: percentage of fiscal revenue from intergovernmental transfers in
the MSA/PMSA in 1962 [Source: Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999)1
MANSHR: share of the labor force employed in manufacturing in the MSA/PMSA
in 1990 [Source: Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1999)1
Samecityl6: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has been living in the same city
since the age of 16.
SamestateiG: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has been living in the same
state since the age of 16.
% born in state: fraction of the population in the MSA/PMSA who was
born in the same state where they currently live [Source: authors' calculation on
CensusCD9O]
same county: fraction of the population in the MSA/PMSA who in 1985
was living in the same county as in 1990 [Source: authors' calculation on Cen-
susCD9O]
same house: fraction of the population in the MSA/PMSA who in 1985
was living in the same house as in 1990 [Source: authors' calculation on Cen-
susCD9OJ
NOMIXMARRIAGE: dummy equal to 1 if respondent is against mixed
marriages. Original GSS survey question: "Do you think there should be laws
against marriages between blacks and whites?". Prompted answers coded in the
GSS variable 'RACMAR': 1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don't know. Our variable takes value
1 if RACMAR=l and zero otherwise.
NOBLKDINNER: dummy equal to 1 if respondent has not had a black
person home for dinner in past few years. Original GSS survey question: "During
the last few years, has anyone in your family brought a friend who was a black home
for dinner?". Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable 'RACHOME': 1=Yes;
2=No; 8=Don't know; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if RACHOME=2
and zero otherwise.
NORACPUSH: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that blacks should
not push. Original GSS survey question: "Here are some opinions other people
have expressed in connection with black-white relations. Which statement on the
card comes closest to how you, yourself, feel? The first one is: Blacks shouldn't
push themselves where they're not wanted". Prompted answers coded in the OSS
21variable 'RACPUSH': 1=Agree strongly; 2=Agree slightly; 3=Disagree slightly;
4=Disagree strongly; 8=No opinion; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if
RACPUSH= 1 and zero otherwise.
NOHALFSCHOOL: dummy equal to 1 if respondent would not send chil-
dren to school with half children of the opposite race. Original GSS surveyques-
tion: "Would you yourself have any objection to sending your children to a school
where half of the children are Whites /Blacks?".Prompted answers coded in
the GSS variable 'RACHALF': l=Yes; 2=No; 3=Don't know. Our variable takes
value 1 if RACHALF=l and zero otherwise.
RACTEACH: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that racists should be
allowed to teach. Original GSS survey question: "Consider a person who believes
that blacks are genetically inferior. Should such a person be allowed to teach in
a college or university, or not?". Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable
'COLRAC': 4=Yes, allowed; 5=Not allowed; 8=Don't know; 9=No answer. Our
variable takes value 1 if COLRAC=4 and zero otherwise.
NOBLKPRESID: dununy equal to 1 if respondent would not vote for black
president. Original GSS survey question: "If your party nominated a Black for
President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?". Prompted
answers coded in the GSS variable 'RACPRES': l=Yes; 2=No; 8=Don't know;
9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if RACPRES=2 and zero otherwise.
NOBUSING: dummy equal to 1 if respondent opposes busing. Original GSS
survey question: "In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of black and white
school children from one school district to another?". Prompted answers coded in
the GSS variable 'BUSING': 1=Favor; 2=Oppose; 8=Don't know; 9=No answer.
Our variable takes value 1 if BUSING=2 and zero otherwise.
NORACDIN: dummy equal to 1 if respondent strongly objects to having op-
posite race home for dinner. Original GSS survey question: "How strongly would
you object if a member of your family wanted to bring a black friend home to din-
ner? Would you object strongly, mildly, or not at all?". Prompted answers coded
in the GSS variable 'RACDIN': 1=Strongly, 2=Mildly, 3=Not at all; 8=Don't
know; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if RACDIN=1 and zero otherwise.
RACSEGR: dummy equal to 1 if respondent strongly agrees that whites
have a right to segregated neighborhoods. Original GSS survey question: "White
people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want to, and
blacks should respect that right". Prompted answers coded in the GSS variable
'RACSEG': 1=Agree strongly; 2=Agree slightly; 3=Disagree slightly; 4=Disagree
strongly; 8=No opinion; 9=No answer. Our variable takes value 1 if RACSEG=l
and zero otherwise.
NORACCHNG: dummy equal to 1 if respondent says that he/she would
not try to change racist rules in a club. Original GSS survey question: "If you
22and yonr friends belonged to a social club that would not le whites/blacks join,
would you try to change the rules so that they could join?". Prompted answers
coded in the GSS variable 'RACCHNG': 1=Yes; 2=No; 3=Wouldn't belong to
club; 8=Don't know; 9=No answer, Our variable takes value 1 if RACCHNG=2
and zero otherwise.
RACSPEAK: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that racist people
should be allowed to speak in public.
Original 085 survey question: "Consider people who believe that whites are
racially superior to all other races. Should such a person be allowed to hold public
meetings to express their views?". Prompted answers coded in the 058 vari-
able 'RACSPEAK': 1=Definitely allowed; 2=Probably allowed; 3=Probably not
allowed; 4= Definitely not allowed; 8=Don't know; 9=No answer. Our variable
takes value 1 if RACSPEAK=1 and zero otherwise.
RACLIBR: dummy equal to 1 if respondent thinks that racist books should
be allowed in library.
23Table Al: Summary statistics
MeanStd. Dcv. No. obs.
Trust .400 .499 9364
Cohort 1941.2517.844 9323
Age<30 .242 .428 9323
Age3O-39 .245 .430 9323
Age5O-59 .126 .332 9323
Age￿60 .217 .413 9323
Married .537 .499 9362
Female .561 .496 9364
Black .169 .375 9364
Educ<12 yrs .234 .423 9344
E•duc>16 yrs .221 .415 9344
Children .398 .490 9299
ln(real income) 10.014 .936 8585
Fulitime .516 .500 9364
Partime .102 .302 9364
Divorced/Separ .159 .366 9362
Trauma .382 .486 8068
Protestant .598 .490 9345
Catholic .263 .440 9345
Jewish .025 .158 9345
Other religion .026 .158 9345
Size of place 4.283 2.174 9364
Med HH income 10.374 .144 9364
Med HH inc 2 107.640 2.993 9364
Crime .059 .019 9219
Gini .416 .027 9364
Race .355 .147 9364
Ethnic .670 .073 9364
NOMIXMARRIAGE.179 .383 5245
NOBLKDINNER .631 .483 4550
NORACPTJSH .301 .459 2473
NOHALFSCHOOL .177 .381 4679
RACTEACH .435 .496 4558
NOBLKPRESID .116 .320 4642
NOBUSING .752 .432 5026
NORACDIN .067 .250 1745
RACSEGR .07462 4558
NORACCHNG .278 2562
RACSPEAK .629 .483 4561





Confidence in banks & fin, institutions .27 .06*
Confidence in major companies .25 .14*
Confidence in organized religion .30 .04*
Confidence in education .32 .01
Confidence in exec. branch of fed. gov. .17 .06*
Confidence in organized labor .12
Confidence in press .19 .01
Confidence in medicine .49 .06*
Confidence in television .15 -.04*
Confidence in supreme court .32 .12*
Confidence in scient community .40 .15*
Confidence in congress .14 .02
Confidence in military .35
Cmi .41
Racial fragmentation ('Race') .36
Ethnic fragmentation ('Ethnic') .67
Notes: *denotessignificance at the 1 percent level.
26Table 2: Individual determinants of trust





Age30-39 -.027 (.020)-.030(.020)-.030 (.021)
Age5O-59 Q49* (.025) Q54*(.027) Q53*(.027)
Age￿60 .074* (.042)-.068(.042)-.065 (.042)
Married -.004 (.013)-.020(.016)-.022 (.017)
Female -037" (013)-027"(013)-.028" (013)
Black -.236" (.015)-.240"(.016)-.245"(.017)
Educ<12 yrs -138" (016)-128"(016)-.128" (017)
Educ>16 yrs .180" (.012).180"(.013).180"(.014)
Children .004 (.013) .013 (.013) .013 (.014)
ln(real income).056" (.008).055"(.008) ,056**(.008)
Fuiltime -.002 (.017)-.001(.018) -.001 (.018)






Other religion -.001 (.045)
STATES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YEARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. ohs. 8500 7321 7313
Pseudo Rsq .10 .11 .11
ObservedP .42 .42 .42
PredictedP .40 .40 .40
Notes: *denotessignificance at the 10 percent level. **atthe 5 percent level.
(a) Marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means.
(b) Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity & clustering of the residuals at the
MSA level.
27Table 3: Heterogeneity and trust
Dependent variable: Trust
[1] [2] [3] [4] 5]
Size of place -.003-.002-.001-.003-.001
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Med 1111 income 7.071" 6.036** 7373** 6.924** 7.897**
(2.695) (2.696) (2.435) (2.663) (2.779)
Med 1111 inc. 2 334* -.286" -.371" -.327" 374**
(.129) (.129) (.117) (.128) (.133)
Crime -.070-.040-.018-.077.012







INDTV CONTROLS" YesYes Yes YesYes
STATES YesYes Yes YesYes
YEARS YesYes Yes YesYes
No. obs. 71967196719671967196
Pseudo Rsq .11 .11 .11 .11 .11
Observed P .42 .42 .42 .42 .42
Predicted P .40 .40 .40 .40 .40
Notes: *denotessignificance at the 10 percent level, **atthe 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means. Standard errors
corrected for heterosl<edasticity and clustering of the residuals at the
MSA/PMSA level.
(a) Individual controls: all those listed in col. 2 of Table 2.
28Table 4: Instrumenting Gini
Panel A: 2SLS Dependent variable: Ti7ust
Instrument set:
N00V62 NGOV62 NGOV62 NGOVG2
REVIG62MANSHR REVIG62
OLS MANSHR
[1] [2] [3] [4] [6]
Gini -.888" -4.302" -3.383"_4.724*-3.551"
(.268)(1.969)(1.576)(2.534)(1.784)
No. ohs. 7064 7064 7064 7064 7064
Rsq. .13 .12 .13 .12 .13
Hausman (p-value) .055 .154 .038 .106
Sargan (p-value) .074 .534 .063
Panel B: First Stage Dependent variable: Gini
[7] [8] [91 ["]
NGOV62 .0001".0001".0001".0001"
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
REVIG62 .137" .160"
(.056) (.069)
MAN SHR -.038 -.049
(.073) (.076)
No. ohs. 7064 7064 7064 7064
R sq. .66 .66 .66 .67
CONTROLS@) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
STATES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
YEARS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: (a) Controls include all the individual controls listed in col. 2 of Table 2 and
the community variables listed in cot. 1 of Table 3.
29Table 5: Mobility and trust
Depend cut variable: Trust



















Pseudo Rsq .10 .10 .11 .11 .11
Observed P .42 .42 .42 .42 .42
Predicted P .40 .40 .40 .40 .40
Notes: **denotessignificance at the 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients calcdated at the means. Standard errors
corrected for heteroslcedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the
MSA/PMSA level.
(a) Controls: all those listed in col. 2 of Table 2 and col. 3 of Table 3.
30Table 6: Confidence in institutions
Marg.Probit coeff.'4
Dependent var is Cmi Race Black
Confidence in [1] [21 [3]
Banks & fin. inst. .501.151** -.008
(.310) (.061) (.021)
Major companies .149.063 -.140"
(.278)(.052) (.016)




Exec. branch of fed. gov. .117.074 -.074"
(.267) (.050) (.014)








Supreme court .011-.120 _.078**
(.569) (.090) (.019)






Notes: *denotessignificance at the 10 percent level, **atthe 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coefficients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected
for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the MSA level.
Each cell reports the marginal probit coefficient on the variable listed in the
column heading from a regression in which the dependent variable is membership
in the type of group described in the row heading.
(a) Controls include the individuals controls listed in col. 2 of Table 2 and the
community variables listed in col. 1 of Table 3, plus State and Year dummies
31Table 7: Trust and aversion to racial mixing



















[2]Have not had black home














[4]Oppose your children going































































Notes: *denotes significance at the 10 percent level, **atthe 5 percent level.
a) Sample includes non-blacks only.
32Figure 1: Trust
Trust
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